

TOP SECRET
WITH ATTACHMENTS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11 May 1977

Memo For ADMIRAL TURNER

- 1) Does CIA have similar views?
- 2) In any case, would it not be useful for the President to have information on this subject, if it has not already been discussed with him in this detail?

Harold

Harold Brown

Attachment
(Codeword document
dated 5/10/77
DIAIAPPR 158G-77)

25X1

cyl

TOP SECRET
WITH ATTACHMENTS

By H S Sec 12

NSA, DIA reviews completed

NGA Review Completed

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

DIA APPR 158G-77



INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: STRATEGIC IMPACT OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS (U)


10 MAY 1977

COPY 71 OF 77 COPIES



Classified By (K-1)
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule Of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 2
Declassify On Impossible To Determine

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



25X1
25X1
25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

*PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
STRATEGIC IMPACT OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS (U)*



DIAIAPPR 158G-77
10 MAY 1977

25X1

TOP SECRET


25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: STRATEGIC IMPACT OF
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS (U)

Summary



25X1

25X1A

25X1A

effect of such a policy has a greater impact on Moscow than Washington, due to the proximity and hostility of the two communist nations. Because the Soviets recognize the difficulty in effectively locating and targeting the Chinese missile force, they probably assume a "worst-case" hypothesis regarding China's deployed missiles and thus are likely forced into major resource expenditures to monitor and counter that threat.

Background

Chinese Deployment Patterns

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has deployed its force of about 70 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in two modes -- permanent and semimobile. Most of the force is deployed to permanent soft sites clustered into launch complexes.

25X1A

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 1


25X1
25X1TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1



25X1

X01A

5X01A

25X1

[redacted] Under the semimobile deployment concept, a missile unit, which consists of fuel trucks, a missile on a transporter, a transporter-erector, etc., is stationed at a garrison support area or a permanent launch site and travels to a remote area for launch. This area, designated a field position, is normally little more than a small launch pad in a widened spot on a road. The site usually has few or no permanent buildings and is rarely occupied. Such a deployment concept seems to be predicated on a period of increasing tension prior to nuclear hostilities. This time span would allow a launch unit to be dispatched from permanent facilities to a remote field site without being preemptively struck in garrison. These field sites are easily and cheaply constructed [redacted]

25X01A

25X1

[redacted] China's two CSS-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are deployed to hardened silos built into leveled areas carved from hillsides. These silos are also in very mountainous terrain [redacted]

25X01A

Discussion

Chinese Deployment Theory

25X1

[redacted] China's MRBM-IRBM deployment patterns are designed to create uncertainty in the minds of any potential nuclear aggressor. Because both permanent and field sites are located in mountainous terrain and, [redacted]

25X01A

[redacted] a potential aggressor can never be confident that he has located and targeted the entire Chinese MRBM-IRBM capability.

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 2

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1A

potential adversaries, particularly those who may not have discovered China's two operational silos, to be aware of the PRC's ability to deploy (70 percent) silo-based ICBMs.

[REDACTED]

25X1A

Thus, even with their small ICBM force, the Chinese seem intent on creating uncertainty in the minds of potential nuclear adversaries and thus to maximize the deterrent effect of the force.

Impact of Chinese Deployment Patterns on USSR-US Threat Perceptions

US Perceptions

[REDACTED] In Peking's view, its most likely nuclear adversaries currently are the USSR and the US. From Washington's viewpoint, China poses no immediate threat to the continental US. China does, however, have the capability to launch about 70 MRBMs and IRBMs and two ICBMs against US bases and allies in Asia. The US also recognizes that Chinese strategic missiles could be used in a tactical, theater support role if a conventional conflict occurred in China or near the latter's borders.

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 3

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

Soviet Perceptions

25X1

[] From Moscow's viewpoint, however, China is a major problem. Sharing a very extensive border with the PRC and being a prime challenger for the right to interpret communist dogma, China is an inherent military threat to the USSR and a principal ideological adversary. China's missile capability, while not a viable offensive threat to the Soviet Union, may be a credible deterrent to any Soviet intention to initiate nuclear hostilities. Moscow could not unleash (80 percent) a missile strike against the PRC without facing nuclear retaliation by the Chinese.

25X1

25X1A

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 4

25X1

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

25X1


Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

TOP SECRET

25X1



DIA 25X1
25X1

IA

25X1

[redacted] China's first silo-deployed ICBM became operational late in 1975. Numerous open-source references to the operational status of the missile began to appear at that time. The 13 Oct 75 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology noted the "recent Chinese deployment of two CSS-X-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles with warheads in the three-megaton range..." The article also claimed that "the Chinese ICBM has a range of more than 3,500 nautical miles, sufficient to hit Moscow and other industrial targets in the USSR. Silo for a third

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 7

25X1
25X1

TOP SECRET


25X1
25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

CSS-X-3 has been constructed, but the missile has not been emplaced..." In testimony before a congressional committee in July 1975, an authoritative source stated that "a limited-range ICBM, the CSS-X-3, could become operational at one silo this year... the CSS-X-3 will cover nearly all of the USSR." This testimony became publicly available three months later. Other publications, including The Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, and The New York Times, carried articles at the same time on China's deployment of the CSS-X-3.

25X1A



DIA 25X1
DIA

DIA
25X1



25X1A

25X1

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 8

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

DIA
25X1

25X1 DIA

25X1 DIA

25X1

[Redacted] The US perception of the Chinese missile threat should not change appreciably until a full-range ICBM enters China's strategic inventory. [Redacted]

DIA25X1

[Redacted] the US should be able to estimate the Chinese missile capability with a minimal margin of uncertainty. Such, however, will not be the case for the Soviet Union.

PREPARED BY:

DIA25X1

[Redacted] USAF
DB-2B

10 May 77

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 10

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6

Approved For Release 2005/06/28 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800110017-6